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UNDERCOVER ANTI-POPULISM
Larry D. Kramer*
Larry Sager established himself as one of the nation's preeminent
scholars of constitutional law more than twenty-five years ago, with
the publication of his now classic Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Norms.1  Countless articles of equal interest and
importance followed, on topics ranging from religious liberty to group
deliberation to congressional control of Supreme Court jurisdiction.
What Sager writes is, in fact, very nearly required reading for those of
us who toil in the fields of constitutional law and theory. But this is
the book we have been waiting for. This is the book that lays out and
articulates the project that has defined the arc of Sager's long and
distinguished career. Justice in Plainclothes finally offers us the
mature Sager on constitutional interpretation, neatly packaged in a
single, continuous text.2 Carefully crafted and elegantly written, it
presents the full flowering of Sager's thinking about the Constitution,
honed and refined by almost four decades of work and contemplation.
Justice in Plainclothes is not a long book. But its size is deceptive,
and its text is rich with nuance and complexity. The book is a worthy
product of Sager's long labor, and one could easily spend two or three
times the number of pages he wrote unpacking its ideas and
considering its subtleties. Yet while there is much that is good here,
and much to be learned, I want in this short Essay to focus on the
premise of Sager's argument with which I disagree most-a postulate
that is central to both our projects but about which we reach
essentially the opposite conclusion. I mean, of course, the role of
ordinary citizens in interpreting the Constitution, or what I (and
others) have referred to as "popular constitutionalism." 3
* Richard E. Lang Professor of Law and Dean, Stanford Law School.
1. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978). Sager updated his thesis fifteen
years later in Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness
of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993).
2. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice (2004).





The basic principle of popular constitutionalism can be briefly
stated. It is, in a nutshell, the idea that ordinary citizens are our most
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution: that their views about
the meaning of the Constitution, collectively expressed, reflect the
highest authority when it comes to resolving disagreements about
what the document permits, forbids, or requires. To someone who
embraces popular constitutionalism, it is not enough to say that
ordinary citizens can change the text through amendment, whether
under the process specified in Article V or via some more informal
route, since the undoubted popular authority to make constitutional
law neither diminishes nor excludes any concurrent power to interpret
it. Nor is it enough to say that ordinary citizens can have views and
express their discontent by agitating for change-not if this still means
that the final say is formally lodged in some outside body whose mind
the community must persuade. Hence, popular constitutionalism can
conveniently be contrasted with legal constitutionalism, which
formally makes the Supreme Court the final repository of interpretive
authority and limits popular participation in amending the
Constitution, trying to persuade the Justices to alter their opinions, or
seeking to change the Court's membership through appointments if
and when Justices die or retire.
There is a sense in which Sager seems at first to embrace a quite
robust commitment to popular constitutionalism. He emphasizes, for
example, how the domain of constitutional justice does not encompass
"all of political justice"-leaving many, perhaps most, of its demands
to be worked out in ordinary politics.4 And carrying forward the
thesis from his original Fair Measure article, Sager argues that this is
true even for a multitude of questions within the narrower arena of
"constitutional justice."5 Indeed, Sager devotes three full chapters,
nearly a third of his book, to explaining the "thinness" of the
adjudicated Constitution, stressing not just that the Constitution is
significantly "underenforced" by courts, but that it is appropriately
so.
6
Upon further reflection, however, one comes to see that Sager's
apparent embrace of democratic authority is largely rhetorical-at
least when viewed in light of the kinds of questions that have actually
comprised (and still comprise) our nation's long-running debate over
judicial authority. Take Sager's recognition of a domain of political
justice beyond the reach of the Constitution, one that is necessarily
left to politics.7 This might be seen as an important concession to
4. Sager, supra note 2, at 132.
5. Id. at 84-128.
6. Id. at 12-42.
7. Id. at 7-8.
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popular authority were there anyone who contended otherwise:
anyone, that is, who claimed that judges had the power and
responsibility to decide every question of justice broadly conceived.
So far as I am aware, however, no one at any time or anywhere has
ever made such a claim. Sager thus concedes to democratic politics
only that which everyone on both sides of the debate has always
conceded. Actually, he concedes less than most, for while recognizing
the existence of this domain of political justice outside the
Constitution, Sager defines it narrowly by relocating certain major
questions, like the right to minimum welfare,8  within the
Constitution's boundaries. He is not alone in taking this step, of
course, though plainly this is a position held by only a minority of
constitutional lawyers and scholars.9 What is significant, though,
because it reflects a general pattern in Sager's thinking, is that he
predictably chooses the position that enlarges the set of issues
arguably subject to judicial supervision.
To be fair, Sager is explicit in stating that the constitutional right to
minimum welfare is, for the most part, a prescription properly
underenforced by the judiciary.' The qualifying phrase "for the most
part" matters, however, because locating a right within the sphere of
constitutional justice opens the door to a range of judicial policing
around the edges, what Sager calls "the Court's secondary
enforcement role"" -a kind of slow-creeping judicial regulation that,
in the mode of a landfill, gradually expands as courts create solid
ground for themselves and use that ground to generate a steadily
widening body of judicial doctrine. 2
Nor can the underenforcement thesis itself be portrayed as a real
concession or commitment to popular participation in constitutional
decision making, not when viewed against the background of our
actual practices and debates. Consider, first, that the domain of
constitutional justice Sager says should not be controlled by courts is
defined entirely by the limits of judicial competence. If courts can
adjudicate a question of constitutional principle, then they should do
so-and, in Sager's world, their decision should trump that of anybody
and everybody else. Underenforcement is confined to principles of
constitutional justice that are so "wrapped in complex choices of
strategy and responsibility" that judges are incapable of resolving
them in a principled manner, though even then any judicial hesitation
exists only "in the first instance" and Sager counsels courts to step in
8. Id. at 87, 95-102.
9. See William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165
(2001); Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of
Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1893 (2001).
10. Sager, supra note 2, at 87.
11. Id. at 100.
12. Id. at 95-102.
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and police popular institutions to the full extent possible. 3 The
determination and definition of where judicial competence ends,
moreover, is entirely in the courts' own hands, leaving judges alone to
decide where the proper boundary lies between the adjudicated and
the unadjudicated Constitution. Add to this Sager's admonition that
the amendment process be made as difficult as possible and phrased
so as to maximize judicial discretion, 4 and the picture begins coming
into focus. Underenforcement is a device for urging politicians to
recognize some responsibility to treat certain issues as constitutional
(though Sager suggests, wrongly in my view, that attaching the label
"constitutional" to a political issue is not likely to have much effect). 5
It is, in addition, a justification for further judicial intervention around
the edges of issues beyond judicial competence. The one thing it is
not, however, is an argument for limiting or in any way curtailing
judicial authority along the lines proposed by skeptics of judicial
review.
Americans have been fighting about the proper scope of judicial
authority over the Constitution from the beginning. The arguments
on both sides of the debate were, in fact, fully developed by the time
of Thomas Jefferson's election or, at the very latest, by the time of
Andrew Jackson's, and surprisingly little has been added since that
time. Sager's position represents the far end of one side in this
debate: the side supporting broad judicial authority. Any appearance
to the contrary comes from his explaining that position by imagining a
still more extreme position that no judge and only a handful of
philosophers have ever advocated. Sager would thus concede to
politics and deny to courts mainly that which has always or almost
always been conceded to politics. He would give to courts not only
that which has been most frequently addressed by courts, but virtually
the entire territory that has been subject to dispute. Indeed, he offers
a variety of arguments-from secondary judicial enforcement to
cramped use of Article V--designed specifically to enlarge the
territory subject to judicial control as far as possible (or as far as
possible without breaking utterly from past practice). Sager's theory
thus justifies a very strong version of judicial power, and so by the
same token reflects a correspondingly strong repudiation of popular
constitutionalism.
One sees the heavy anti-populist tilt in Sager's argument most
clearly in his chapter on amendments and the "birth logic" of a
constitution.16 The appropriate role for citizens, Sager argues there, is
to adopt a constitution that articulates basic principles at a very high
level of generality. Having done so, he continues, the popular
13. Id. at 87.
14. Id. at 164, 169-71.
15. See id. at 94.
16. Id. at 161-93.
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decision-making group 17 that wrote the Constitution should bind both
their own hands and those of posterity by making it as difficult as
possible to modify or further specify the principles, leaving the
remainder of the work-the task of actually implementing and
applying the Constitution over time and in particular contexts-to the
judiciary."8 Sager calls this a "partnership" between judges and
citizens.19 If so, the judges become by this means distinctly senior
partners, with everyone else as junior co-venturers possessing little or
no practical authority to gainsay their superiors' decisions.
Consider how this is meant to work in practice. No one disagrees or
would disagree with the sorts of generalities Sager means for the
people at large to include in the body of the constitution, certainly not
if articulated at the level of abstraction he deems appropriate. No one
would argue with the idea that a constitution should guarantee
"liberty" or "equality" or "free speech" and the like. But the
meaningful and important work all involves the application of these
broad principles in concrete circumstances, something Sager urges
should be centralized in the judiciary. In practice then, Sager's
prescription amounts to a straightforward delegation of ruling
authority to an elite over whom the public is meant to have as little
control as possible (short of creating a true formal aristocracy).
What is striking about this formulation is its inconsistency with what
most of us regard as the basic touchstone for measuring legitimacy in
a system of self-government-namely, the right to govern oneself.
Sager argues persuasively that there is no necessary symmetry
between the process for creating a constitutional system and that for
changing it. If, as he says, an autocratic Queen Liza created a
democratic order and then suffered a change of heart, we would not
say she could unilaterally reassert her authority simply because it was
by her authority that the democratic order was created in the first
place.2" But isn't that because, in our normal hierarchy of principles,
the more democratic authority trumps the less democratic one?21
Hence, reverse Sager's hypothetical and suppose that a democratic
polity decided to anoint Queen Liza. There is little doubt, I think,
that this same polity could reverse its decision, and could do so based
17. Id. at 161-63.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 14-22.
20. Id. at 165-66.
21. This was, in fact, among the arguments offered by Federalists in response to
Anti-Federalist charges that the rule for adopting the Constitution was "illegal"
because it was inconsistent with the requirement of unanimity in the Articles of
Confederation: the Articles had been adopted only by the state legislatures, whereas
the Constitution was being ratified by the people themselves. See The Federalist No.
22, at 145-46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); The Federalist No.
43, at 297-98 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); James Madison, Vices of
the Political System of the United States, in 9 The Papers of James Madison 346, 353
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
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on original authority, because the original democratic authority would
be deemed normatively superior to Queen Liza's autocratic power,
from whatever source derived.
Yet this is precisely what Sager means to deny. His argument in
favor of restricting the power to control the judiciary through
amendment is that a democratic authority has set up an autocratic one
and, in doing so, should be understood to have all but completely
precluded itself from taking that authority back. Instead of Queen
Liza, we have Queens Sandra and Ruth-working with Kings William,
John, Antonin, Anthony, David, Clarence, and Steven. The domain
over which these nine Kings and Queens govern is, to be sure, smaller
than that of Queen Liza. In Sager's world, they rule only over the
most important questions of liberty and freedom. But having
allegedly given them power, Sager argues that there is no necessary
logic or authority that would entitle us to take it back.
II.
It is noteworthy in this respect that Sager does not defend his
theory as the best one that could be devised. Nor does he advocate it
as something that should be followed by everyone everywhere. One
suspects this might be his view, but Sager's actual claims are more
modest, and his text reflects a genuine uncertainty about the reach of
his theory outside the setting of American law today. As the book's
subtitle makes clear, his is a theory of American constitutional
''practice": an effort to provide an attractive account for a course of
conduct or activity that already exists.
In making this move, Sager is relying on a familiar method of legal
justification, the one we teach implicitly by spending so much time
with students on the common law. We look to what courts actually
do; we put a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of existing practice,
simply because it is existing practice; and we offer the best theoretical
justification for that practice, with the expectation that this should
guide future action. The "best" account, in this model, is whichever
one offers the most normatively attractive justification that also fits
the practice.
Tricky questions arise around the edges: What if not all of the
practice can be fit into the theory offered to explain it? How should
we choose among competing theories if one is marginally stronger as a
normative matter, while another does a marginally better job of
capturing what courts do? What if the best normative justification is
still unattractive, or there is a competing justification that is much
more attractive but that requires substantially changing the practice?
As all lawyers know, there are no simple answers to these questions,
which ultimately call for judgment and depend on one's ability to
persuade. The general approach, in any event, is the distinctly legal
version of a widely accepted form of philosophical pragmatism. It
1348 [Vol. 73
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calls upon us to explain an established practice in the most sensible
and coherent manner possible-which is precisely what Sager
attempts to do in Justice in Plainclothes.
A common objection to this form of argument concerns defining
whose practice or practices we are talking about. In ordinary legal
contexts, the practice in question typically is that of a particular court
or courts, meaning there is neither confusion nor disagreement about
precisely whose behavior and understanding an author is trying to
explain. Most discussions of judicial review, for example, take the
U.S. Supreme Court and its decisions as both starting and ending
points. But Sager's goal is more ambitious, and he wants a theory that
encompasses more than just what the Court does. "What makes a
constitution interesting," he observes at the outset, "is what a people
do with it."22 Sager wants a theory that describes and justifies the
constitutional practices of the broader American political culture.
Courts have a central place in Sager's theory because this is his
understanding of the broader culture. But he is attempting to do
more than offer the best justification for what the Court is doing from
the Court's own perspective. He means to encompass the way in
which Americans generally understand our Constitution, including
why we might permit judges to exercise a power of review at all.
Hence, Sager's emphasis on the several "partnerships" that he says
comprise our constitutional practice.
The problem is that once we move outside the narrowly
circumscribed world of judges, it is no longer clear whether Sager's
references to "our constitutional practice"23 are accurate or even
meaningful. His description of how the Constitution is interpreted
and applied, for example, probably does correspond to the beliefs of
many in the professional elite. But there is by now a quite substantial
empirical literature suggesting that Americans outside the profession
have widely disparate beliefs as to the nature, exercise, and
distribution of authority in our constitutional culture-beliefs that
they act upon and that have a substantial effect in shaping the law. 4
There exists, this literature suggests, no single practice to be
explained, but rather a wide variety of practices which are not all
consistent, which co-exist, and which come into direct conflict only
rarely."
This is, as I mentioned above, a familiar sort of objection. But let's
put it aside and assume for the moment that Sager's description of
"our constitutional practice" is accurate as respects most Americans
today. What if, as I argue in my book, this is just a temporary,
22. Sager, supra note 2, at 1.
23. Id. at 12-14.
24. I surveyed this literature briefly in Larry D. Kramer, Popular




politically and historically contingent, turn-of-the-wheel? What if the
evolution of "our constitutional practice" has been cyclical rather than
linear, with alternating rules and principles exercising a dominant
influence at different times? I want especially to focus on what I take
to be the critical difference between Sager's account and mine,
namely, the role of ordinary citizens in determining constitutional
meaning. As I tried to show, two major positions on this question
have competed for preeminence practically from the beginning.26 On
one side, we have had the Jeffersonian view, which triumphed
decisively in the critical election of 1800 and dominated politics in the
early republic.27 Adherents of this view agreed that courts could
exercise a power of judicial review, but with no notion that judicial
decisions were supreme, judges were expected-indeed, were
required at risk of punishment-to defer to clearly expressed and
settled popular opinion as mediated through the complex federal
political structure. On the other side was the Federalist position that
emerged over the course of the 1790s,28 of which Sager is a direct
descendant. Like Sager, adherents of this position pressed the need
for judicial supremacy over a substantial domain of what they now
urged for the first time should be understood as "legal" questions
suited for final determination in and by courts.
These two positions have existed in a dialectical tug of war
throughout American history. Struggle has not been constant, but has
instead consisted of periodic confrontations or blowups occurring
after years or sometimes decades during which active backers of the
two perspectives jostled for position while ordinary citizens remained
largely indifferent or unconcerned. The Jeffersonian position-
popular constitutionalism-appears to have been the dominant public
understanding during most of these latent periods, even as judicial
supremacy was favored by, and within, the legal profession.29
Certainly popular constitutionalism was the clear victor each time
matters came to a head. Yet the end of one cycle simply began
another in which the Court and its supporters eventually renewed
their efforts to establish judicial supremacy.30 Resurgent claims of
judicial authority, in turn, gave rise to a new wave of criticism, as
opponents of the judiciary pushed back by advocating a revived or
restored commitment to popular constitutionalism.31 And so it has
gone, round and round.32
26. See Kramer, supra note 3, at 105-44.
27. Id. at 105-14.
28. Id. at 128-44.
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 207-26.
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This matters, I think, because it undercuts the normative structure
of Sager's argument. If today's practice is but the latest in a see-
sawing battle over constitutional authority, if it is a contingent
political development still contested by a competing approach that can
equally be defended as normatively attractive, then more is required
to make the theory persuasive than showing that what we are doing at
this particular moment is defensible. The implicit weight attached to
the fact that something is our practice dissipates if that practice has
been varying and continues to be up for grabs. At the very least, we
need some sort of straight up comparison with the alternative practice
and its normative justification.
III.
What should such a comparison look like? At one time, debates
about judicial supremacy were framed as a choice between principles
of democracy, on the one hand, and fidelity to law and justice, on the
other. Opponents of judicial review denounced the practice as
inconsistent with self-government,33 while its proponents urged that, in
a conflict between democracy and justice, the latter should prevail.34
More recently, defenders of judicial power have started describing
supremacy as an aspect of democratic theory. To be legitimate, they
say, democracy requires decisions made after a certain kind of
deliberation, which courts can do with and for the American people
better than other available institutions. The choice, in other words, is
between two versions of democracy: one that utilizes courts to
advance the cause of political justice, and another that leaves this
cause to the hazards of popular politics.
Though much could be said both for and against this latter position,
I will not take up the cudgels here. For while Sager makes occasional
gestures in this direction, he relies mainly on a bolder and more
innovative claim, one that confronts proponents of the democratic
principle head-on and insists that they are overstating their position.
The object of government, Sager says, is political justice. And while
33. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation, 1997 BYU
L. Rev. 517 (1997); Robert H. Bork, The Judge's Role in Law and Culture, 1 Ave
Maria L. Rev. 19 (2003).
34. Ronald Dworkin, the best and most famous exponent of this view, at one
point flatly asserted that "[t]he United States is a more just society than it would have
been had its constitutional rights been left to the conscience of majoritarian
institutions." Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 356 (1986). Democracy was important,
Dworkin acknowledged, but so too was justice, and surely it made sense to think that
democracy should yield when the two collided; limiting ordinary politics was a good
thing if the limits were in the service of a more just society. Id.
35. This was Dworkin's position in his most recent work in this vein. Ronald
Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 15-19
(1996). For another work that takes a similar approach, see Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government 71-73, 77-78 (2001).
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democracy is surely an aspect of political justice, it just as surely is not
the whole of it. With respect to certain kinds of decisions-those that
are "preference-driven" and do not depend on principle, as well as
some matters of principle that are deeply entangled in questions of
policy- political justice demands a commitment to democratic
decision making.36 But for other decisions, and in particular for the
crucial determinations about liberty and equality that lie at the heart
of constitutional justice, democracy has no special claim to priority.
Such decisions should be made by whichever institution or institutions
in society will give the best answers.
At this point, any differences between Sager's theory and those of
his predecessors vanish, and the question comes down to a simple,
pragmatic assessment of who will make the best decisions. Whatever
the theoretical relationship between judicial supremacy, political
justice, and democracy-whether the principles stand in opposition or
are aspects of each other-the argument for conferring special
authority on the judiciary rests on a simple claim that judges can and
will do a better job than the rest of us. Or, to be more accurate, that
the judicial process is a superior process for making decisions about
constitutional principle than the political process.
This point, which is crucial, is too often obscured by the elaborate
theorizing of writers on both sides of the debate. But the choice
among dueling theories ultimately boils down to nothing more than an
empirical question of comparative institutional capability. Like all
advocates of judicial power, Sager believes that the judiciary can and
will deliberate about political justice (or at least the subset of political
justice encompassed in the "liberty bearing" provisions of our
Constitution) better than the available alternatives.37 This is the heart
of the matter; everything else is decoration.
I addressed this claim of relative judicial superiority at some length
in both my book and a subsequent article,38 and so will confine myself
here to a brief recapitulation of points previously made. The first
thing to note is that there is no reliable evidence to support the
proposition that the judiciary does a better job than the political
branches when addressing matters of political justice. It is, of course,
unclear exactly what proof of such a proposition would look like, but
certainly nothing in our history or in the history of other countries
without judicial review supports a claim that courts are superior. If
anything, the record of courts relative to legislatures in this country
supports the opposite conclusion. It is only by foreshortening history
and treating the anomalous Warren Court as if it were the norm that
any claim on behalf of the judiciary can be maintained. But if
36. Sager, supra note 2, at 139-40.
37. Id. at 70.
38. See Kramer, supra note 3, at 233-48; Kramer, supra note 24, at 985-1008.
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predictions about institutional capacity are needed, why look at
Brown and Roe rather than at the 150 or so laws struck down by
judges anxious to stymie progressive reform during the three decades
of the Lochner era? Are the accomplishments of the Court in the
1960s and 70s typical, or should we think instead of the dismantling of
Reconstruction; of Dred Scott; of the federalist era, judicially-inspired
sedition campaign; or of the current Court's systematic hobbling of
federal power to remedy discrimination?
Nor does the claim for courts find more or better support in the
experience of other nations. On the contrary, as Jeremy Waldron has
noted, the many societies that lack judicial review-think of England,
New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, and France-"seem to be at
least as free and as just as the United States."3 9 Sager claims at several
points in his argument that there is a trend for other countries to
follow the example of the United States by creating constitutional
courts with powers similar to ours.4" But he ignores critical differences
in the structure of these courts that make such comparisons
misleading. Other nations that adopt judicial review carefully
regulate their courts to ensure greater political control. In recognition
that constitutional adjudication is not a normal function for the
judiciary, they remove their constitutional courts from the ordinary
judicial process and limit their jurisdiction exclusively to deciding
constitutional questions. Given the high political station thus
accorded, additional safeguards have then been added to ensure an
appropriate level of political accountability. Appointment to the
bench typically requires a supermajority in one or both houses of the
legislature, guaranteeing that constitutional courts have a mainstream
ideology, while the judges serve terms that are limited and staggered
to ensure a regular turnover. In addition, the constitutions themselves
are much more easily amendable than ours. The combined effect of
these innovations is to relieve the pressure a doctrine of judicial
review creates by reducing the likelihood of breaches between the
constitutional court and the political branches, and by making political
correctives easier to implement when such breaches occur. In the end,
any resemblance between judicial review in these foreign courts and
in ours is more superficial than real.
But Sager does not rely on historical experience to defend the
institutional superiority of the judiciary. Rather, like most writers in
this vein, he relies on impressionistic descriptions of the legislative and
judicial processes. The judiciary is well suited to address questions of
constitutional justice, Sager says, because judges "are considerably
more detached from the pressure of public opinion than are regularly
elected public officials" and because judges "are obliged to give each
39. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 288 (1999).
40. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 2, at 199.
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other and the broader audience of their opinions reasons for their
decisions. '"41 Combine with this "the collegial, deliberative nature of
constitutional tribunals in our legal system" and the fact that courts
specialize in constitutional adjudication, Sager concludes, and one has
a solid basis for entrusting the Constitution to courts.42
Even on its own terms, this reasoning rests on a variety of
controversial, yet undefended, assumptions. To take just one
example, consider Sager's point about judges being detached from
public opinion. It is almost reflexive among constitutional lawyers to
assume that this is a good thing. But why? A conventional originalist
might say that detachment is good because the Constitution is a piece
of positive law whose full meaning was deposited in the text by
enactment and is recoverable only through a technical process of legal
interpretation. But that is not Sager's answer, and he emphatically
rejects such reasoning. Yet once we understand the Constitution as
calling for a more fluid and open-ended process of moral reasoning,
public opinion no longer seems so obviously inappropriate. Why isn't
it an argument in favor of political resolution that legislators are more
likely to respond to public opinion when addressing questions of
constitutional principle, particularly given our usual epistemic
principle that hard choices are best made by those with a sufficient
stake in the matter?43 The answer must be, though this remains
implicit, that "the public" does not reason about these questions
properly; that when my mother (or yours) makes a judgment about a
woman's right to get an abortion, it is an emotional or irrational
response and does not evidence a process of moral reasoning worthy
of respect. Not as worthy as that of the Justices, in any event.
Putting aside the normative questions raised by assumptions like
these, how accurate is the underlying portrayal? Judicial supremacists
tend toward hyperbole in their depictions of courts and legislatures,
and Sager is no exception. His judiciary is an intellectual debating
society where judges sit studiously pondering and discussing weighty
questions of principle before crafting careful explanations that reflect
deeply on the theoretical and philosophical dilemmas they have faced.
Yet the judiciary is a far more complex institution than such stories
would have it. No less than legislators, judges are subject to
influences and incentives that skew their judgment. A desire to
expand their own authority and responsibility is an obvious example.44
More complicated, as Keith Whittington explains, the Supreme Court
is itself enmeshed in and dependent upon "its own set of interest
groups, from corporate litigants to public interest legal groups, that
seek to influence its decisions" and that play a critical role in setting
41. Id. at 74-75.
42. Id. at 75.
43. Waldron, supra note 39, at 253.
44. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 26 (1999).
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the Court's agenda, framing the issues, and giving shape to the
arguments.45 "Judicial politics is not the same as legislative politics,"
he concedes, "but the reasoning of judicial constitutional
interpretation is deeply contested and implicated in the same
considerations as extrajudicial constitutional interpretation."46
Still, the main criticism should not be that judges are somehow
really just like politicians. They are not. Politicians are
unquestionably influenced more and more directly by "outside actors"
than are judges. A lot more. This is the whole basis and reason for
arguing that we should prefer legislators to judges on democratic
grounds. Legislatures do not perfectly mirror or translate popular
will, and courts are to some extent responsive to democratic pressures.
But it would be ludicrous to treat the two as comparable in this
respect.
The main criticism is, rather, that judges are just like judges, which
is to say that they are not at all like philosophers or academics. Even
ignoring what we know about how undeliberative the judicial process
really is and pretending that judges are more involved in crafting
opinions than we know to be the case, articulating, even
contemplating, visions of justice just is not a big part of the job.
Analyzing precedent; examining antecedent practices; making crude,
seat-of-the-pants judgments about policy and consequences-these
describe a typical day's work at the Court. Sometimes, to be sure, the
Justices (or their clerks) throw some fancy sounding rhetoric into the
opinions, but the Court's deliberations are almost wholly technical
and legalistic. To take an obvious example, compare the opinion in
Brown47 with the congressional debate over the Civil Rights Act of
1964.48 As instances of serious deliberation about matters of principle,
the comparison is not even close. The same thing could be said for
almost any issue that comes up in both the Court and Congress,
whether it be abortion, the death penalty, gay rights, euthanasia, or
whatever. One may not like what the legislators have to say, though it
seems hard to me to say that discussions in Congress compare
unfavorably with those of the Court on issues like gay rights, abortion,
race, or other current problems. Be that as it may, in terms of focus,
emphasis, and amount of energy expended, congressional debates are
explicitly about substantive values to a much greater extent than
judicial opinions or deliberations.
There is nothing wrong with this. We expect and want our courts to
be technical and legalistic. Laymen and first-year law students
45. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 817 (2002).
46. Id. at 817-18.
47. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).




sometimes bridle at law's technicality, angrily resisting it as an effort
to mystify and confuse them. But of course, it is not. There are good
reasons for most of law's complexity, reasons that explain why we
need a body of lawyers and judges with the necessary experience and
training to run the age-old machinery of the law. This is why we do
not want our lawyers and judges pretending that they are somehow
specially suited to engage in deliberations about morality and
principle for the rest of us. The needs and demands of law serve to
divert judges from making decisions based on abstract principles in
much the same way as the needs and demands of politics do for
politicians. The particular distortions differ, but the consequences are
just the same in limiting the space available to think about or act on
these sorts of considerations. This is not a formalist claim that judges
are constrained by some inherent quality of legal doctrine; that would
be silly, especially as applied to the Supreme Court. It is, rather, a
claim about the culture of judging, which structures how judges
approach their jobs just as the culture of politics does for politicians,
and not only pushes judges toward the technical and legalistic, but
generally keeps them there.
Turning to Congress, the portrayal of legislators as sating a single-
minded obsession with re-election by becoming willing puppets of
narrow interest groups is scarcely less distorted on its side than the
picture of judges as black-robed philosophers. As Mark Tushnet
notes, scholars who study Congress generally agree that while
legislators are naturally concerned with re-election, they have other
things on their minds as well-not the least of which is making a
difference and building a reputation by creating good public policy.49
Political debates on matters of constitutional principle are common in
Congress because voters care about such matters, and an important
element of any legislator's job consists of explaining decisions to
constituents back home. 0
The point is not that it is the members of Congress rather than
judges who turn out to be our great moral reasoners. To accomplish
anything, legislators must work with interest groups. This has
important benefits that legal commentators tend too easily to
overlook, such as providing legislators with much needed information,
helping them to understand and anticipate how legislation will affect
relevant groups, reducing uncertainty about how different laws might
be received by voters, and helping to communicate relevant
information to the public. 1 But the process inevitably requires all
49. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 65-66; see also Richard L. Hall, Participation in
Congress (1996).
50. See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions 47 (3d ed. 1989);
Whittington, supra note 45, at 821.
51. See Jeffrey M. Berry, The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen
Groups 87-118 (1999); John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm
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sorts of compromises. Conscientious legislators must struggle against
politics to find space for completely principled decision making, space
that is rarely if ever unconstrained in the real world. Yet to say that
legislators do not operate in some Habermasian ideal speech situation
is not to say that the legislative process is therefore non-deliberative
or devoid of principle. Congressional decisions still turn on whether
appropriate justifications can be found for a vote, such as justifications
that are persuasive, that a legislator believes he or she can publicly
offer to constituents back home, and that are consistent with or
reasonably distinguishable from other positions he or she has taken.52
None of this argues conclusively against the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. It simply calls into question assumptions about judges and
legislators that commentators like Sager take for granted. Yet given
our actual historical experience, not to mention the experience of
other democracies that have flourished without judicial review, how
confident should we be that it is necessary to assign the Court this
high political authority? How significant is the difference, really,
between the Court and Congress? Even assuming that the Court is
less affected (or, more plausibly, differently affected) by short-term
political pressures, what about the pressures that do distort its
decision making--ideology, lack of information, ignorance of
consequences, the confounding effects of law's technicality, and the
like? And even if these distortions are for some reason less
worrisome, how should we weigh any residual difference against the
superior democratic pedigree attached to decisions made by other
political institutions? Is it not significant in this respect that the Court
itself is invariably as divided as the rest of the country on controversial
questions? Given divisions on problems that simply do not have clear
answers, why should we prefer a majority of nine to a majority of the
larger population?
IV.
Bear in mind that I am not suggesting that courts be excluded from
the process of deciding constitutional questions. Popular
constitutionalism rejects only the idea of judicial supremacy, which is
overlaid atop judicial review to discourage and minimize opposition to
the Court's decisions. The difference between Sager's position and
mine is thus ultimately a matter of degree. Conceptually, it turns on
the role one imagines for popular authority when it comes to
questions of constitutional interpretation. In practice, it affects the
Lobby, 1919-1981 (1991); John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying,
Contributions, and Influence (1996); Richard A. Smith, Advocacy, Interpretation, and
Influence in the U.S. Congress, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 44 (1984).
52. R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 64-87 (1990); Richard
F. Fenno Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts 141-57 (1978); Kingdon,
supra note 50, at 47-54.
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nature of any public debate and the sorts of tools available to oppose
or pressure the Court. In Sager's world, these tools are limited to
efforts to persuade the Justices to change their minds and the
appointments process. In my world, political responses like those
used by past Presidents such as Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and
Roosevelt remain legitimate.
As I explained in my book, this would not mean more conflict, nor
would it significantly alter the day-to-day business of deciding cases.
It would, however, produce a new and different political equilibrium,
one in which the Court is more attentive and responsive to the views
of other actors with regard to the proper meaning of the Constitution.
Supreme Court decisions could still be expected to settle most
constitutional disputes. Courts do come last, after all, and their
rulings will be final as a practical political matter except where
opposition is strong enough to overcome the many institutional
hurdles our system puts in the way of those seeking to upset an
existing state of affairs. Once the Court has ruled, moreover, these
hurdles consist of more than just getting by both houses of Congress
(with a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate) and the President.
They now include getting agreement that the difference is important
enough to challenge the Court, which can itself become a quite
significant impediment.
The potential usefulness of the judiciary in a separation-of-powers
scheme is not difficult to comprehend, and politicians and ordinary
citizens alike can and do appreciate that there are advantages in giving
the Court some leeway to act as a check on politics. This includes
understanding that many benefits of judicial involvement are systemic
and long term, and so may require accepting individual decisions with
which one disagrees. It takes a lot to persuade a majority in this
country that particular rulings are wrong enough to overcome this
presumption. The upshot is that the Court's conduct must be quite
provocative and very unpopular, usually over a sustained period,
before it will produce actual legislative or executive countermeasures.
It does not follow that nothing is at stake in the choice between a
system of judicial supremacy and one based on departmental or
coordinate construction. In the latter system, the authority of judicial
decisions formally and explicitly depends on reactions from the other
branches and, through them, from the public. This, in turn, can make
an enormous difference in how the Justices behave. There may be
political obstacles to punishing the Court that make it possible even
without judicial supremacy for the Justices to have their way most of
the time. But the obstacles are smaller-smaller by precisely the
weight conferred on Supreme Court decisions by the doctrine of





I said above that the difference between Sager's position and mine
is ultimately a matter of degree. One might wonder whether this
difference is important enough to worry about. Most people clearly
believe that it is-believe, in other words, that the decision to promote
or defend an idea of judicial supremacy matters. When Sager
describes a domain of constitutional justice that he urges should be
defined by courts, he means to discourage other actors in our system
from interfering (again, by any means other than trying to persuade
the Justices or replacing them when opportunities to do so arise). In
Sager's constitutional system, the Justices are supposed to have the
final say, and this institutional prerogative is itself an argument for the
other branches to defer. In my constitutional system, the Justices
have to earn their claim to have the final say and are neither final nor
infallible beyond their ability to claim the confidence of a watchful
public in going about their business. This may reflect a difference in
shades of gray rather than black versus white, but it does reflect a
difference, and an important one at that.
So how do we choose? Earlier, I criticized Sager for relying on
impressionistic descriptions of the judicial and legislative process, but
it cannot have escaped anyone's notice that I've offered no hard facts
to refute him. Nor can I do so, for the problem of proof here is
intractable. The debate may turn on a question that looks
straightforwardly empirical, but at every critical juncture, the
arguments needed to reach judgment rest on controversial
assumptions-assumptions about whose truth, if we are being honest,
it is difficult to have too firm a conviction because they depend on the
sort of "facts" that can never be tested or proved. As I urge in The
People Themselves, the choice one makes on this issue does not turn
on evidence or logic, much as intellectuals on both sides of the
question might want to believe otherwise. It turns-no less today
than it did in 1800-on differing empirical hunches about popular
government and the political trustworthiness of ordinary people.
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